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The Standing of Citizens to Enforce against 
Violations of Environmental Statutes in the United 
States 
Friends ofthe Earth Incorporated v Laidlaw Environmental Services 120  S Ct 693 
(2000)  
(The full text of the judgment can be found at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/) 
Analysis by Jeffrey G. Miller, James A. Hopkins Professor of Law, Pace 
University School of Law, White Plains, New York 
Introduction 
Judicial actions by private citizens have played a critical role in the development 
and enforcement of federal environmental law in the United States over several 
decades. The courts' general receptivity to the standing of private environmental 
plaintiffs has made that role possible. A troika of Supreme Court decisions on 
standing in environmental cases authored by Scalia J over the last decade had 
eroded that general receptivity, casting doubt on the continued vitality of private 
actions in developing and implementing environmental law. The Court's recent 
decision in Friends ofthe Earth Inc v Laidlaw Environmental Services halts this erosion. 
In Laidlaw the Court held that a plaintiff organisation whose members' aes- 
thetic and recreational interests were injured by the defendant's discharge of 
mercury into the North Tyger River in Roebuck, North Carolina in violation of 
the terms of a permit issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act' (CWA), had 
standing under the CWA's citizen suit provision2 to seek the assessment of civil 
penalties for the violations. It also held that the case had not become moot even 
though the defendant had achieved 'substantial compliance' before trial. 
Laidlaw should make American environmentalists dance in the streets. It is 
the first case on standing under environmental statutes in years in which the 
Supreme Court has held that citizen plaintiffs have standing. It is the first of 
seven CWA citizen suit cases decided by the Court in which citizen plaintiffs 
have prevailed. And it is only the third of thirteen CWA cases decided by the 
Court since 1981 in which a position favourable to environmental interests has 
prevailed. Although Laidlaw does not entirely abandon the Court's earlier preced- 
ent on standing in environmental cases, it recasts them in a more favourable 
' 33 USC 1251, 1342. 
33 USC 1365. 
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light. It could mark a sea change in the Court's attitude toward standing, citizen 
suits and even environmental law. 
To explain the significance of the decision, this analysis begins with discussions 
of the role of citizen litigation in American jurisprudence and the Court's recent 
opinions regarding standing in such cases. 
A Short Histoly of Private Environmental Enforcement 
Private litigants have brought thousands of law suits over the last several decades challenging 
public and private actions as contrary to federal environmental law. Many of them were actions 
for judicial review of agency decisions challenged as contrary to statutory authority, a cause 
of action created by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).3 Others were mandamus actions 
against the federal government under 'citizen suit' provisions common to federal environ- 
mental statutes. Still others were citizen suit actions to enforce against violations of those 
statutes by the regulated public. The Clean Water Act (CWA), for instance, authorises suit 
both against the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for failing to 
take an action required by the CWA and against polluters for violating the requirements of 
the CWA.' 
Some of these actions against the EPA have had profound impact on the development of 
environmental law and policy. An example is the action commenced by the Natural Resources 
Defense Counsel (NRDC) against the Administrator of the EPA for failing to promulgate 
standards sufficient to protect public health from the discharge of toxic pollutants, required 
by the CWA as originally enacted in 1972. Clearly failing to fulfil its statutory mandate, the 
EPA had issued few of the required standards both because it lacked supporting health data 
and because it feared the standards would be extremely disruptive of industry. Rather than 
risk a court order to do what it considered both impossible and unwise, the EPA entered into 
a consent decree with NRDC, agreeing to concentrate its promulgation of the CWA's second 
round of technology-based pollution reduction requirements for industry on the control of 
toxic pollutants.5 This approach was ultimately embraced by Congress, which amended the 
CWA to incor~orate it into Title 22  of the Code of Laws of the United States6 and to eliminate 
"" 
the EPA's mandatory duty to promulgate health based standards for toxic pollutants under 
this Title.' 
Citizen suits against polluters who are in breach of regulatory requirements (the 'regulated 
public') have been effective supplements to government enforcement. Indeed, when the 
Reagan administration virtually stopped enforcing the environmental statutes, citizen enforce- 
ment replaced federal enforcement. Although these actions have not directly developed envir- 
onmental policy, they have developed judicial interpretation of the statutes. For instance, 
citizen suits against violating industries established (long before the EPA even tried to 
establish) that once a court finds a defendant had violated the CWA, it must assess a civil 
penalty.8 Indeed, the ease of private enforcement of the CWA, with its permitting and self- 
reporting systems, in contrast with the difficulty of private enforcement of other pollution 
control statutes, helped to make manifest that the CWA's systems were more efficient and 
more easily enforced delivery systems than those employed by many other pollution control 
statutes. This, in turn, led to the adoption of the CWA's systems in the other statutes, such 
as the Clean Air Act.' 
5 USC 551, 702. 
' 33 USC 1265(a)(i) & (2). 
NRDC u Train, 8 Env Rep Cas (BNA) 2 12 1 (DDC 1976). 
33 USC 1311(b)(2). 
33 USC 1317. The action and its consequences are described in R. O'Leary, 'The Courts and the EPA: 
The Amazing "Flannery Decision"', 5 Nut Res @? Enu 18 (1990). 
Atlantic States Legal Foundation u Tyson Foods Inc, g 13 F nd 1 128 ( I  i th Cir 1990). 
42 USC 7401, 7661-766if. 
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The citizen suit section of the CWA is typical of such provisions in most federal environ- 
mental statutes.'' It authorises citizen enforcers to sue the EPA for failure to perform a 
mandatory duty and to sue members of the regulated public for failure to comply with the 
CWA. It bars suit, however, unless they first notify the EPA and, in suits against members of 
the regulated public, the violator and the state, of their intent to sue at least sixty days in 
advance of bringing suit. It also bars suit against a member of the regulated public if the 
EPA or the state is diligently prosecuting an action to require compliance in federal or state 
court. Another provision bars citizen suits for civil penalties under some circumstances if the 
EPA or a state have assessed administrative penalties." It authorises the EPA to intervene 
in any citizen suit and requires plaintiffs to notify the EPA of a proposed settlement of a 
citizen suit, allowing the EPA to oppose judicial approval of settlements it deems inadequate. 
It authorises courts to issue injunctions requiring compliance and to assess civil penalties for 
violations. Finally, it authorises an award of attorneys fees to prevailing parties. The latter 
has been interpreted liberally for awards to prevailing plaintiffs and narrowly for awards to 
prevailing defendants. 
Pre-Laidlaw Standing Doctrine 
None of these private actions could be successful, of course, unless plaintiffs have 
standing to bring them. Standing, as a constitutional doctrine, rests on Article 
I11 of the Constitution, which limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to 'case[sl 
- - 
or contro~ers[ies]'.'~ Historically this c;nstitutional limitation has been inter- 
preted to mean only 'whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be pre- 
sented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of 
judicial res~lution' . '~ Standing doctrine developed erratically, causing Douglas J 
to observe that '[gleneralities about standing to sue are largely worthless as 
such'.I4 The seminal standing decision in environmental law was Sierra Club v 
Morton, 405 US 150 (1972), in which the Supreme Court held that injury to 
aesthetic, conservation, and recreation interests, as well as to economic interests, 
could support standing to sue. Ironically, in that decision, the Court denied 
standing to thc Sicrra Club, bccausc it sought standing on its own bchalf rathcr 
than on behalf of its members. 'Representational standing' of environmental 
organisations to represent members who have standing has become a hallmark 
of private environmental litigation. 
Appointments to the Court during the administrations of Presidents Reagan 
and Bush gave it a more conservative cast, resulting in more restrictive standing 
decisions. This new trend was signalled in a concurring opinion by Scalia J in 
Gwaltney of SmitJield Ltd v Chesapeake Bay Foundation Inc.I5 In Gwaltney the Court 
interpreted the CWA's citizen suit authority to sue persons 'alleged to be in 
violation' not to confer subject matter jurisdiction over violations which were 
'wholly past' at the time the complaint was filed. Gwaltney, the defendant, also 
argued that plaintiffs were required to prove the existence of ongoing violations 
l o  33 USC 1365. 
" 33 USC 1319(8)(6). 
l 2  US Const Article 111, s 2, cl 1 .  
l 3  Flast u Cohen, 392 US 83, 101 (1968). 
I' Association ofData Processing Service Organizations u Camp, 397 US 150, 15 1 (1970). 
l 5  484 us 49 (1987). 
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before subject matter jurisdiction could attach. The majority rejected that conten- 
tion, holding that good faith allegations of ongoing violations in the complaint 
were sufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. Gwaltney argued this would 
allow plaintiffs to maintain suit by making good faith allegations to support 
standing, when they in fact lacked standing. The majority countered that defend- 
ants had the opportunity to contest standing at the summary judgment stage 
and the trial stage. At the summary judgment stage plaintiffs had to prove at 
least that there was a contested matter of fact as to standing and at the trial stage 
they had to prove standing. Finally, it posited mootness doctrine as a backstop to 
prevent continued litigation when there was no possibility of further violations, 
although it cautioned that the burden on the defendant to prove mootness was 
heavy. Scalia J, joined by Stevens and O'Conner JJ, commented in concurrence 
that the more important question was standing. They considered that if the 
defendant was in compliance at the time the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs 
could have suffered no remediable injury at that  time, and therefore had no 
standing to bring the suit; the same facts that established the lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction established the lack of standing. 
Writing the majority opinions in subsequent cases, Scalia J developed his view 
of standing as the Court's doctrine. In the first case, Lujan v National Wildlfe 
Federation," the plaintiff challenged the wholesale reclassification of 1,250 tracts 
of federal land, making them available for mineral exploitation. The basis of its 
challenge was the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA creates a cause 
of action for '[a] person suffering legal wrong . . . or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action' to seek judicial review." The issue considered by the 
Court was whether the plaintiff's members were injured by an agency action. 
That is not a constitutional standing issue as such, rather an issue of statutory 
interpretation. But the issue of whether the plaintiff's members were injured 
covers the same ground as standing. Scalia approached it as if it were a standing 
issue, and the four dissenters argued it as a standing issue. To establish that two 
of its members were injured, the plaintiff submitted affidavits alleging that they 
used land recreationally in the vicinity of two of the tracts opened for mineral 
exploitation and their use and enjoyment of the federal land was thereby injured. 
Neither in their affidavits nor in depositions did they offer proof that their recre- 
ational use and enjoyment extended to the tracts whose classification had been 
changed, that mineral exploitation would take place on the tracts, or that they 
had actually suffered or would suffer any loss of their recreational use or enjoy- 
ment. The majority found this did not amount to proof sufficient to establish 
injury at the summary judgment stage. Even if it did, it would do so only for the 
two tracts affected, not for the other 1,248 tracts. The decision was a close one: 
five to four, with a strong dissent on almost every point. 
In the second case, Lujan v Defenders of Wildli$,'8 the Court held that an environ- 
mental group lacked standing to challenge regulations under the Endangered 
Species ActIg exempting federal actions outside of the United States from the 
l 6  497 us 871 (1990). 
5 USC 702. 
504 us 555 (1992). 
16 USC 153 1-44. 
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requirement that federal agencies consult with the Department of Interior before 
taking actions that might adversely affect endangered species. Scalia laid out a 
three pronged 'irreducible minimum' test for standing. First, the plaintiff must 
suffer an 'injury in fact'; an injury to a legally protected interest that is concrete 
and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, the injury must 
be 'fairly traceable' to the complained of action. And third, the injury must be 
'redressable'; it must be likely, not just speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favourable judicial decision. Moreover, plaintiffs had the burden 
at all stages of litigation to establish their standing. The Court found affidavits 
by two of the plaintiff's members insufficient to establish the first prong. The 
affidavits averred that the members had viewed or tried to view endangered spe- 
cies in Egypt and Sri Lanka, wanted to return to do so again, and specific federally 
funded projects in those countries reduced their chances of seeing the endangered 
species in the absence of consultation with the Department of Interior. The Court 
found that a 'some day' desire to return was not kfficient to demonstrate a real or 
imminent injury. Seeking underpinnings for his view of standing, Scalia invoked a 
series of opinions denying standing to plaintiffs alleging injury as taxpayers to 
support their suits for various 'good government' causes of action. He commented 
that standing was almost automatic for a person at whom a government action 
was directed, and difficult for anyone else. Kennedy, Souter, and Stevens JJ filed 
concurring opinions, agreeing in the outcome but distancing themselves to vari- 
ous degrees from Scalia's arguments. Blackmun J wrote a vigorous dissent, in 
which O'Conner J joined. 
Finally, Steel Company v Citizensfor a Better Environmentz0 was a replay of Gwaltney 
in a Court with a different composition and under the citizen suit provision of 
a different statute. Two issues were before the Court: whether the statute con- 
ferred subject matter jurisdiction over wholly past violations and whether the 
plaintiffs had standing to sue for wholly past violations. The violations at issue 
were failures to file required reports of toxic chemical releases. The defendant 
filed all the reports after the plaintiffs gave notice of their intent to sue and 
before they filed their complaint. In Gwaltney the majority opinion had addressed 
the subject matter jurisdiction issue extensively and touched on the standing 
issue only to outline the differences in the plaintiff's burden of establishing 
standing at different stages in the litigation. Scalia J's dissent in Gwaltney con- 
tended that standing as well as subject matter jurisdiction must be addressed 
and that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue for wholly past violations because 
they could suffer no present injuries from them. In Steel Company Scalia, writing 
the majority opinion, vehemently argued that the 'cases and controversies' provi- 
sion of the Constitution required courts to consider as a threshold issue whether 
the plaintiffs had standing and that the plaintiffs in the case had no standing. 
The majority in Steel Company reiterated the three pronged test for standing 
from Defenders of Wildlfe. It side-stepped the first prong, whether plaintiffs suf- 
fered an 'injury in fact' by the late filing of the toxic release reports. Instead, it 
concentrated on the third prong, redressability. It held that if plaintiffs were 
injured by the late filing, that injury was not redressable by judicial action. No 
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remedy available under the statute would compensate plaintiffs for injuries 
caused by late reporting or eliminate any lingering effects from late reporting. 
In particular, the assessment of civil penalties for past violations would not 
redress the injury because they are payable to the US Treasury, not to the plaint- 
iffs. And penalties would only vindicate the general rule of law, not redress plaint- 
iffs' particular injuries. The impact of Steel Company is diluted by the fact that 
six of the nine justices found it necessary to write or join concurring opinions. 
Most of the attention of the concurring justices was devoted to whether standing 
or subject matter jurisdiction should be addressed first. O'Conner, Souter and 
Breyer JJ distanced themselves to varying degrees from Scalia's insistence that 
standing was always the threshold issue. Stevens J, in a concurring opinion joined 
by Souter and Ginsburg JJ, argued vehemently that there was no compelling 
reason that standing be addressed before subject matter jurisdiction; there was 
good reason to address the latter first in this case, and that the lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction in the case was dispositive. Although Stevens' opinion con- 
curred in the outcome, the closest he got to standing was to criticise Scalia's 
preoccupation with redressability, which Stevens regarded as Scalia's latter-day 
supplement to standing doctrine. 
FOE v Laidlaw 
The Lower Court Decisions 
In 1986 Laidlaw bought and thereafter operated a waste incinerator equipped 
with a wet scrubber for air pollution control. Laidlaw treated wastewater from 
the scrubber before discharging it. A CWA permit issued by the state to Laidlaw's 
predecessor and later reissued to Laidlaw established effluent limitations for the 
discharge. (CWA permits are issued by the EPA or, if the EPA has approved a 
state's permit programme as meeting the CWA's criteria, by the state.) The 
discharge repeatedly violated limitations on heavy metals, including mercury. 
Laidlaw experimented with and installed several control devices, eventually 
achieving compliance with all of the effluent limitations except for mercury. In 
the course of three successive permits, the state established changing but strin- 
gent mercury limitations: first 2 0  ppb, then 1.3 ppb, and finally l o  ppb. The 1.3 
ppb limitation in particular was beyond achievement by demonstrated treatment 
systems and the trial court characterised it as 'draconian'. Laidlaw hired qualified 
consultants to help it achieve the limitation. They failed to do so. It had an 
opportunity under the permit to seek an upward modification of the 1.3 ppb 
limitation, but instead of seeking a modification, persevering in efforts to achieve 
compliance with the limitation. Laidlaw kept experimenting and ultimately did 
achieve substantial compliance in 1993. During a short part of this period, it 
ceased operating the facility as a means of compliance. Although Laidlaw perse- 
vered throughout in looking for solutions to its non-compliance, the trial court 
found that it did not take critical steps open to it in a timely fashion. 
In 1992 the plaintiff notified Laidlaw of its intent to sue, as required by the 
citizen suit provision (42 USC 1365(b)(i)(A)). Laidlaw immediately requested 
the state to take judicial action against it, in an attempt to bar the citizen suit 
by 'diligent prosecution' of an action in court to require compliance under 
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1365(b)(i)(B). Laidlaw drafted a complaint for the state, paid the filing fee, and 
drafted a consent decree under which it agreed to pay a $ioo,ooo penalty to the 
state and to use 'every effort' to achieve compliance. The state cooperated, filing 
the complaint and entering the consent decree. The plaintiff thereafter filed suit 
for an injunction requiring compliance and for the assessment of civil penalties. 
Laidlaw immediately moved to dismiss the action as barred by the state court 
action. Not misled by Laidlaw's transparent ploy, the trial court dismissed the 
motion, finding the consent decree did not represent diligent prose~ution.~' Laid- 
law subsequently moved for summary judgment that the plaintiff had not pre- 
sented evidence of an injury in fact to establish standing. After examining affida- 
vits of the plaintiffs members and transcripts of their depositions, the court 
denied this motion, although it found the plaintiff prevailed only by the 'slimmest 
of margins'. After a trial on the merits in 1995, the court found Laidlaw had 
violated its permit's effluent limitations and reporting requirements hundreds of 
times and assessed a penalty of $405,800.~~ Its opinion in this regard is a detailed 
inquiry into many factors relevant to the appropriate size of a civil penalty in an 
environmental case. Part of the penalty calculation was based on the court's find- 
ing that the violations had caused no harm to the environment or public health 
and that Laidlaw had persevered in good faith to comply with technically difficult 
limitations. The court denied an injunction, based on its finding that Laidlaw 
had achieved substantial compliance with the permit, violating the mercury limit 
only 13 times between the filing of the complaint and trail. 
The plaintiff organisation appealed the trial court's penalty assessment as inad- 
equate because it did not recover the economic benefit of non-compliance. Laid- 
law cross appealed, arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing because its mem- 
bers suffered no injury from the violations. Laidlaw based that argument on the 
trial court's finding that the violations caused no environmental OF health harm. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed neither of these issues. Rather, 
in an extremely short opinion it held that the case was moot because Laidlaw had 
achieved c~mpliance.'~ The Fourth Circuit took cues from two recent decisions of 
the Court. The first, Arizonians for OBcial English v A r i ~ o n a , ~ ~  a unanimous opinion 
on mootness written by Ginsburg J, contained a footnote linking standing and 
mootness doctrines. It described mootness as 'the doctrine of standing set in a 
time frame: the requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement 
of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence ( m o ~ t n e s s ) ' . ~ ~  
The second cue, of course, was Steel Company, which reiterated the three elements 
of standing necessary at the commencement of an action and focused on the 
third element, redressability. Combining both cues, the Fourth Circuit held that 
all three of the elements of standing had to continue throughout the action if it 
was not to become moot. Once Laidlaw achieved compliance, there was no injury 
the trial court could redress, a fact underscored by the plaintiffs failure to appeal 
'' Friends ofthe Earth v Laidlaw Environmental Services JTOC) Inc, 890 F Supp 470 (DSC 1995). 
'' Friends ofthe Earth v Laidlaw Environmental Services JTOC) Inc, 956 F Supp 588 (DSC 1997). 
23 Friends ofthe Earth v Laidlaw Environmental Services JTOC) Inc, 149 F gd 303 (4th Cir 1998). 
24 520 us 43 (1997). 
'' 520 US at 68, fn 20, quoting United States Parole Commh v Geraghty, 445 US 388, 397 (1980)~ in turn 
quoting Monaghan, 'Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When', 82 Yale LJ 1363, 1384 (1973). 
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the court's denial of an injunction. The plaintiff therefore failed the third prong 
of the test for mootness. The Fourth Circuit had held in earlier cases that the 
plaintiffs request for civil penalties was sufficient to prevent cases from becoming 
moot in similar circumstances. But it felt compelled by Steel Company to abandon 
its precedents and hold that where civil penalties did not redress any injury to 
the plaintiff's members and, lacking a redressable injury, the case was moot. 
The Court's Decision 
After the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion, the plaintiff petitioned the Supreme 
Court to accept certiorari. In the meantime Laidlaw closed, dismantled and per- 
manently shut its incinerator and put it up for sale. The Court granted certiorari 
to resolve a split between the Fourth Circuit and four other circuits on the issue 
of whether compliance with a permit after commencement of litigation moots 
claims for civil penalties. The opinions in the other circuits were all rendered 
before Steel Company. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit's pre-Steel Company decisions were 
in accord with the other circuits' decisions. Ginsburg J, the newest appointment 
to the bench, wrote the opinion. 
Standing 
Although the Fourth Circuit had ruled only on the issue of mootness, the Court 
began its opinion by ruling that the plaintiff organisation had standing. It stated 
that it had an obligation to do so, since mootness was irrelevant if the plaintiff 
had no standing. Of course, the Court had no obligation to do so. It does not 
customarily address standing every time it overturns an appeals court's reversal 
of a plaintiff's victory. If standing was an issue, the Court easily could have 
remanded it to the Fourth Circuit for a decision on standing. A remand might 
not have promoted judicial economy, but the Court made no mention of judicial 
economy as a reason for deciding rather than remanding the standing issue. The 
Court's insistence on addressing standing in an appeal of a mootness decision 
suggests the Court was seeking an opportunity to change the restrictive gloss 
imposed on its standing doctrine by its recent opinions. Because the chief signi- 
ficance of the opinion is its treatment of standing rather than of mootness, this 
analysis will focus primarily on standing. 
The Court began by reciting the by now familiar three pronged test for 
standing. Half of its discussion of standing focused on whether the plaintiffs 
members suffered an injury in fact. It summarised affidavits from six members. 
All basically asserted they lived near the affected river, had used the river or its 
banks in the past for recreational purposes, and would use the river or its banks 
presently and in the future for recreational purposes but for their concern with 
the pollutants Laidlaw discharged to the river. The Court concluded these were 
just the sorts of aesthetic and recreational injuries that support standing under 
Sierra Club v Morton. And it noted the continued vitality of Sierra Club v Morton 
from Scalia J's remarks in Defenders of Wi ld l fe  that interference with the desire 
to see or use wild animals, even for aesthetic purposes, was an injury in fact that 
could support standing. It contrasted the identification by the plaintiffs members 
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of specific harms in specific parts of a river affected by defendant's actions to the 
very general and conclusory averments of plaintiffs in National Wildlfe Federation. 
In his dissent Scalia J, joined as usual by Thomas J, argued that the trial court's 
finding that the violations caused no public health or environmental harm was 
tantamount to a finding of no injury in fact for standing purposes. The majority 
had two responses. First, it posited that a plaintiff is not required to prove envir- 
onmental injury from permit violations to prevail on the merits, implying that it 
should not be required to prove more to establish standing than to prevail on 
the merits. While its premise is true, its conclusion is a bit of a non sequitur. 
Of course, Congress did not require a plaintiff to prove environmental damage 
to prevail on the merits. (The whole approach of the CWA in establishing water 
pollution control requirements was to switch from reliance on water quality to 
primary reliance on technological performance, because harm to water quality 
was too difficult to prove on a case-by-case basis.) But the Court, not Congress, 
developed standing doctrine and developed it based on constitutional, not prac- 
tical considerations. And the Court could develop the doctrine to the point where 
a plaintiff had standing to enforce against only the small number of CWA viola- 
tions which clearly harm both it and the environment. Indeed, that is precisely 
the direction that Scalia J was trying to lead the Court. The majority's second 
response was simply that the environment does not have to be injured for a 
plaintiff's members to be injured. Their reasonable perception was that Laidlaw's 
pollution kept them from using the river and its environs and was an injury in 
fact, even though it was proven later that the pollution caused no environmental 
or health danger. 
The second half of the majority's standing discussion addressed Laidlaw's con- 
tention that plaintiffs never have standing to seek civil penalties because penal- 
ties paid to the Treasury do not redress private injury. The Court acknowledged 
that the inquiry is a proper one, for a plaintiff must have standing for each claim 
it pursues. In analysing whether it had standing to seek penalties, the majority 
relied on the common sense observation that penalties deter violations and may 
do so as effectively as injunctions. If penalties serve to deter continuance or recur- 
rence of violations that injure a plaintiff's members, penalties redress their injur- 
ies. In response to Laidlaw's contention that Steel Company held plaintiffs had no 
standing to pursue penalties for past violations because they did not redress 
plaintiffs' injuries, the majority correctly replied that Steel Company held only 
plaintiffs had no standing to seek penalties for violations wholly past when the 
complaint was filed, and did not address whether they had standing to seek penal- 
ties for violations that continued when and after the complaint was filed. But 
while that was a correct statement of the narrow holding of Steel Company, it 
ignores the analysis of the redressability of civil penalties in that opinion. Scalia 
J, writing the majority opinion in Steel Company, had stated in the baldest terms 
that civil penalties paid to the Treasury did not and could not redress plaintiffs' 
private injuries. While he was aware of the deterrence argument, he rejected it 
out of hand and none of the separate concurring opinions in Steel Company sug- 
gested that penalties could redress private plaintiffs' injuries. The majority in 
Laidlaw simply repudiated the reasoning of Scalia's majority opinion in Steel Com- 
pany that penalties could not redress private injury. 
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Dissenting in Laidlaw, Scalia elaborated his analysis in Steel Company that penal- 
ties are a public remedy that does not redress private injury. Indeed here he 
began to develop a constitutional argument that allowing private parties to sue 
for public remedies deprives the executive branch of its authority to make 
enforcement decisions, violating separation of powers principles. In a concurring 
opinion Kennedy J raised the same concern. Finally, Scalia argued that the deter- 
rent effect of penalties is too speculative as a matter of law and fact to redress 
a private injury. 
The SignGcance of the Opinion 
Two aspects of the Court's opinion are striking. First, its tone treats citizen suits 
as a valued and legitimate form of litigation. This is in marked contrast to its 
earlier standing opinions authored by Scalia J, which treated citizen suits as a 
form of litigation with limited value and legitimacy. This change of tone sends 
positive signals to lower courts about the value of citizen suits and will impact 
their consideration of a whole range of issues related to them. Second, the Court 
focused its attention on standing, even though the case came to it on an issue 
of mootness. That suggests the Court finally understood where Scalia J was trying 
to lead it on standing and seized the opportunity to turn its back on his leader- 
ship. The earlier decisions contained many hints of dissatisfaction with his direc- 
tion. In Defenders of Wildlfe and Steel Company, the only members of the Court 
who were unequivocally behind Scalia's opinion were Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Thomas J. All the rest either wrote or joined concurring opinions or dissented. 
The disenchantment of Stevens and O'Conner JJ with Scalia's approach is par- 
ticularly striking, for they had joined him in the beginning in his concurrence in 
Gwaltney. A part of the colloquy before the Court in Laidlaw suggests the disen- 
chantment may be both personal and doctrinal. Laidlaw's counsel responded to 
a statement by Scalia J, 'I'll agree with that, although I'm not sure I understand 
it.' Laughter. Stevens J interjected, 'We have learned not to do that.' More 
laughter.26 
Scalia's dissent in Laidlaw is further evidence that his long term objective has 
been to limit, almost to the point of elimination, citizen's use of the courts to 
challenge government actions or to enforce federal laws. For standing in citizen 
suits, he would require plaintiffs to suffer injuries sufficient to maintain tradi- 
tional public or private nuisance actions. He would not concede standing for cit- 
izens to sue for civil penalties under any circumstances. Indeed, he rejects the 
underlying objective of citizen suit provisions to empower citizens as 'private 
attorneys general'. He regards this as a violation of separation of powers prin- 
ciples, at least for the assessment of penalties. His attitude toward citizen parti- 
cipation in government by way of lawsuit is well summarised by his candid 
remarks in Defenders of Wildlfe that economic interests subject to governmental 
action would always have standing to challenge the action as more stringent than 
required by statute, but that members of the public would rarely have standing 
to challenge the same action as less stringent than required by the statute. When 
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hedged in by all of the restrictions he would raise, citizens would have very little 
role in environmental law litigation. And he would develop his restrictions as 
constitutional limitations, so that they could not be undone by another branch 
of the government. Although not known for eschewing hyperbole, Scalia J's bitter 
reaction to the Court's abandonment of his leadership on standing is palpable in 
the language he uses to describe the Court's opinion: 'watered-down, inexplicably, 
casual, a sham, cavalier, grave implications for democratic government, revolu- 
tionary, and uncritically.' 
The most significant departure from the Court's earlier decisions is on the 
injury in fact requirement for standing. The Court makes it clear that the injury 
required is injury to the plaintiffs, not to the environment, and that the plaintiffs 
may be injured even if the environment is not injured. This follows from the 
proposition first enunciated in Sierra Club v Morton and frequently repeated there- 
after that injuries to aesthetic and recreational interests are sufficient to support 
standing. ~esthet ics ,  of course, are perceptions by people, not the environment. 
Recreation is an activity conducted by people, not the environment. Scalia would 
require both the environment and plaintiff's interest in it to be injured for 
standing. In National Wi ld l fe  Federation he asked whether any of the lands near 
those used by plaintiff's members had actually been converted to mining or would 
be converted to mining. In Defenders of Wi ld l fe  he asked whether federally funded 
projects had actually affected endangered species observed by plaintiff's mem- 
bers. And in Steel Company he wondered if plaintiff's members could suffer a 
cognisable 'informational' injury, although he did not address the question. And, 
of course, he makes it explicit in his dissent in Laidlaw that both plaintiff's mem- 
bers and the environment must be injured to support standing. His coupling of 
the two injuries had not gone unnoticed by the lower courts which increasingly 
asked plaintiffs to demonstrate injury to the environment by defendant's 
 action^.^' Proving injury to the environment from many violations of environ- 
mental statutes may be difficult or impossible, as exemplified by the lack of envir- 
onmental harm from the discharge of mercury in this case, despite the highly 
toxic nature of mercury. Proving injury to the reasonable perceptions of the 
plaintiff's members, however, is relatively easy. Indeed, Scalia J states that it is 
as easy as good pleading. But it is more than just good pleading; according to 
the Court the injury to perceived values most be a reasonable result of the defend- 
ant's actions. The Court provides no guidance on what is reasonable, leaving that 
as an issue for further litigation in the lower courts. Moreover, the Court cited 
National Wi ld l fe  Federation and Defenders of Wildl fe  with approval and both found 
no injury to support standing. 
It should be noted that the opinion does not abandon the three pronged test 
for standing developed by Scalia J. Although Stevens J earlier made a compelling 
argument that redressability is not part of the Court's traditional conception of 
standing, but a latter-day add-on by Scalia J, the Court retains redressability and 
merely applies it differently than Scalia would. Although Scalia's leadership on 
standing my have been shunned by the Court, the shadow of his earlier opinions 
and framework they established still remain. 
'' See Public Interest Research Group o fNew  Jersey u Powell D u h n  Terminals Inc, 914 F nd 64 (3rd Cir 1990). 
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In his concurrence to Laidlaw, Stevens J states that the trial court entered a 
valid judgment on penalties and that no post-judgment conduct by a defendant 
could render that judgment moot. Indeed, he notes that all courts of appeal 
considering the issue except the Fourth Circuit's opinion below, had held that 
post-complaint conduct by a defendant could not render moot a claim for civil 
penalties for violations that continued at the time the complaint was filed. But 
the Court's retention of redressability as a test for both standing and mootness 
appears to rule out second and perhaps even the first of these two possibilities. 
Kennedy J's agreement with Scalia that the separation of powers argument is 
at least a real issue, also invites further litigation. That is surprising, for the 
Court has decided issues in many citizen suit cases in which the district courts 
had assessed penalties, including Gwaltney, without even hinting that the assess- 
ment of penalties raised a constitutional issue. Indeed, two decades ago the Court 
noted that civil penalties could be assessed in citizen suit cases.28 In Laidlaw the 
Court commented that Scalia's 'grave implications for democratic government' 
observation was 'o~erdrawn ' .~~  Since none of the justices joining the majority 
opinion joined Kennedy's concurrence, six of the nine justices apparently agree. 
The issue has been argued in and rejected by several lower courts. They concluded 
that the Court's separation of powers cases all precluded one branch of govern- 
ment from exercising powers entrusted by the Constitution to another branch. 
Since the citizen suit provisions do not give executive powers to the courts or the 
legislature, they do not violate separation of powers d~ctr ine.~ '  All of this suggests 
attempts to stifle citizen suits on separation of powers grounds will not be success- 
ful. But since Kennedy J often exercises a swing vote on the C ~ u r t , ~ '  his concur- 
rence encourages further litigation on the issue and indicates that its outcome 
is not certain. 
Laidlaw: Some Observations from the UKEU 
Analysis by Chris Hilson, Lecturer in Law, University of Reading 
The US Supreme Court's decision in Laidlaw raises a number of interesting points 
of comparison with the position in the UK and the EU. To a European observer, 
one of the most striking aspects of US law on standing is the explicit role played 
by judicial politics. 'Citizen suit' provisions-many of which were introduced by 
a Democrat Congress during the 1970s-have allowed citizen enforcement to 
circumvent the poor enforcement record of the regulatory agencies seen under 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v National Sea Clammers Association, 453 US 1, 14, n 25 (1981). 
'' 120 S Ct  a t  708, n 4. 
30 For a particularly well-reasoned opinion see Atlantic States Legal Foundation Inc v Buffalo Envelope, a Division 
ofAmerican Envelope Co, 823 F Supp 1065 (WDNY 1993). Contra, see W.H. Lewis Jr, 'Environmentalists'Author- 
ity to Sue Industry for Civil Penalties Is Unconstitutional under the Separation of Powers Doctrine', Env LR 
(April 198%). 
31 R.J. Lazarus, 'Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in the Supreme Court; 1 7  Pace Env rev (1999) 
1, 6-7. 
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certain Republican executives.' It is thus hardly surprising that from the late 
1980s to the late iggos, a predominantly conservative Supreme Court, led by 
Justice Scalia, chose to block such Congressional moves by holding that these 
provisions were in breach of the Constitution's rules on standing.2 After all, poor 
enforcement is a form of deregulation-a policy much favoured by Republicans. 
However, it also comes as no surprise that Laidlaw saw a liberal Supreme Court 
seeking to fulfil an earlier Democrat Congressional mandate, even at a time when 
there is a Democrat executive: presidential elections are looming and the political 
colour of the executive may soon change. 
UK environmental litigation can similarly be analysed in terms ofjudicial polit- 
ics. During the ig8os, the English High Court was far from pro-environment in 
sympathy. Indeed, given the social background of many of the judges and their 
ascendance from the planning Bar, one would expect many of them to have 
shared the Conservative government's pro-development and deregulatory bias. 
Jonathan Golub has suggested that the English High Court's reluctance to make 
Article 177 (now 234 EC) references to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
during that period, could be explained as a desire by a conservative judiciary to 
protect British environmental policy from the risk of pro-environment judgments 
by the ECJ.3 Much the same might be said of the more restrictive High Court 
decisions on standing such as Rose Theatre4 and, more recently, Garnett5: in both 
cases, pro-developer planning decisions were protected by denying standing to 
citizen challengers. 
However, there are difficulties in applying the judicial politics mode of analysis 
to English High Court decisions. And this stems from the fact that, unlike the 
US Supreme Court, English High Court actions produce individual judgments. 
Judicial politics thus turns on the leanings of the relevant judge and it is difficult 
to make generalisations about the High Court as a whole. Thus, one might com- 
pare the conservative decisions of Schiemann J in Rose Theatre and Popplewell J 
in Garnett with the more liberal decisions of Otton J in Greenpea~e,~ and Sedley J 
in Dixon7-in both of which the applicants were granted   tan ding.^ That said, it 
is interesting to observe that since the election of a Labour Government at the 
beginning of May 1997, there has now been an Article 234 reference from the 
High Court in an environmental caseg and there do not appear to have been any 
restrictive standing decisions. However, to conclude that this is because the more 
conservative judges in the High Court are happy to see Labour environmental 
policy being attacked would be too simplistic. There is little clear water separat- 
' See e.g. Miller's note in this journal; A. Afilalo, 'How Far Francovich? Effective Judicial Protection and 
Associational Standing to Litigate Diffuse Interests in The European Union', Jean Monnet Working Paper i/ 
98, http://w.law.hanrard.edu/programs/JeanMonnet/papers/g8/g8-i-.html; J.E. Bonine, 'Standing to Sue: The 
First Step In Access to Justice', http://merlin.law.mercer.edu/elaw/standingtalk.html. 
Ibid. 
J. Golub, 'The Politics ofJudicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interaction Between National Courts and the 
European Court of Justice' (1996) 19  West European Politics 360. 
' R u Secretary of Statefor the Environment ex parte Rose Theatre Co Ltd [iggo] 1 QB 504. 
R u North Somerset District Council ex parte Garnett [igg8] Env LR 91. 
R u Inspectorate ofPollution ex parte Greenpeace Ltd (No 2) [igg4] 4 All ER 329. 
R u Somerset County Council ex parte Dixon [igg7] JPL 1030. 
Schiemann, Otton and SedleyJ are all now in the Court of Appeal (and thus are LJ). 
Case C-zg3/g7, R u Secretary o fs ta te  for the Environment ex parte Standley [iggg] 2 CMLR 902. 
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ing New Labour's environmental policy from the Conservative's and thus ifjudges 
have reacted in that way, it would appear to be more a matter of general political 
persuasion than one of dislike of a particular policy area. 
In relation to the substantive law at the heart of the case, there are of course 
key differences between America on the one hand and England and Wales on 
the other. In America, there is a number of ways of impugning decisions of the 
environmental regulator (the Environmental Protection Agency), including judi- 
cial review under the general Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and citizen 
suits under specific statutory regimes such as the Clean Water Act. Many citizen 
suit provisions also authorise actions against the regulated for injunctions or civil 
penalties. There are two points worthy of note at this stage. First, other than 
tort actions, the public's right of redress against the regulated stops there. In 
particular, there is no right to bring criminal proceedings against polluters. And 
secondly, standing is necessary for both APA proceedings and citizen suits. In 
England and Wales in contrast, the public has a general power to bring private 
prosecutions under section 6(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985," subject 
to specific restrictions in particular environmental statutes." And there are no 
standing requirements in relation to this power.I2 
In terms of the laws on standing themselves, the old, Scalia approach to 
standing has much in common with that adopted by the ECJ. In the Greenpeace 
caseI3 for example, the Advocate General appeared to suggest that-had they 
adduced sufficient evidence that they were affected by the decision to build the 
power stations-individual residents on the Canary Islands could have demon- 
strated the relevant 'individual concern' for the purposes of standing under Art- 
icle 230 EC. In his view they had not produced enough such evidence to differenti- 
ate them from all others on the islands. The Court itself simply ruled that the 
applicants had failed to differentiate themselves. While it did not mention the 
evidence possibility, neither did it rule it out. Taken together, the Advocate Gen- 
eral's Opinion and the Court's judgment look very much like Scalia's strict 
application of the US 'injury in fact' requirements. 
Domestic laws on standing in England and Wales have, in general, been lib- 
eralised in recent years. In Scalia's dissent in Laidlaw, he states that 'the Court 
makes the injury in fact requirements a sham. If there are permit violations and 
a member of a plaintiff environmental organisation lives near the offending plant, 
it would be difficult not to satisfy today's lenient standard'. Much the same might 
be said of the English courts' current approach to the 'sufficient interest' test for 
standing. Those living in the areas where pollution licences or planning permis- 
sions are granted are likely to have little problem in standing terms.I4 However, 
l o  Although the Director of Public Prosecutions is able to take over proceedings and may also discontinue 
them. 
For example, s 16 Water Resources Act 1991. See further C. Hilson, Regulating Pollution: A UK and E C  
Perspective (Oxford: Hart  Publishing, 2000) p 161. 
Although there are in relation to another of the specific restrictions: under s 4(3) Salmon and Freshwater 
Fisheries Act 1975, in order to bring a private prosecution, a person must obtain a certificate from the Minister 
of Agriculture confirming that he has a 'material interest' in the waters affected. 
l 3  Case C-3a/g5 P Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) v Commission [igg8] ECR 1-1651, 
[ igg8] 3 CMLR 1. 
14 See e.g. Greenpeace, supra, n 6 ,  Dixon, supra, n 7; cf Garnett, supra, n 5. 
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the question remains whether English law has become more liberal still. Is a 
connection with a place still necessary? This author would suggest that it should 
not be: in many cases (particularly those involving transboundary pollution) the 
right of democratic self-determination for those in the relevant area should argu- 
ably be subject to the legitimate interest of outsiders.I5 In other words, the con- 
stituency boundaries of environmental citizenship should be widely not narrowly 
drawn. 
The recent High Court decision in R u Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex parte Greenpeace Ltd 
(unreported)-which involved an  area of the North East Atlantic Ocean and in which standing was granted to 
Greenpeace with very little comment-thus offers no particular clues because there was obviously nobody living 
in the area whose rights to self-determination might have been affected. 
